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state tax notes®
Why States Should Tax the GILTI
by Darien Shanske and David Gamage

Darien Shanske is a professor at the
University of California, Davis, School of Law
(King Hall), and David Gamage is a professor of
law at Indiana University Maurer School of
Law.
In this installment of Academic Perspectives
on SALT, the authors argue that states should
conform to federal tax law and bring global
intangible low-taxed income into the state
corporate income tax base.
Corporate income taxes are a critical
revenue source for both states and the federal
government, yet they have been increasingly
plagued by taxpayers’ use of tax-avoidance
mechanisms for shifting profits to tax havens
and to other (low-tax) foreign jurisdictions. This
is perhaps the central problem of modern
corporate tax administration.
The sweeping 2017 federal tax legislation
attempted to deal with this problem in a
1
number of ways. First, the federal corporate tax
rate was reduced from 35 percent to 21 percent.

Second, the corporate tax base was switched
from being based on the worldwide income of
U.S. corporate taxpayers to a territorial system
in which the corporate taxpayers’ foreign
income is potentially exempt from tax. Third,
new antiabuse rules were implemented to
combat profit shifting, the most important of
which is the global intangible low-taxed income
regime.
Without GILTI’s anti-profit-shifting rules,
the switch to a territorial system for the U.S.
corporate tax base would have turbocharged the
incentives for taxpayers to engage in
widespread profit-shifting tax avoidance
transactions. The essence of how the GILTI rules
work is by identifying foreign assets that are
unusually profitable by means of a formula,
then subjecting that income to U.S. tax even
2
though the income is nominally earned abroad.
These federal developments raise the
question whether states should conform to
federal tax law and bring this GILTI income into
the state corporate income tax base. As a matter
3
of tax policy, the answer is clearly yes.
Some Preliminaries
We will discuss how states should approach
GILTI on the assumption that the federal
formula is, at least in part, successful. This is a
reasonable assumption. First, we agree with
what we take to be the consensus view that
income shifting by multinational corporations is

2

For elaboration, see id.; and Daniel Shaviro, “The New NonTerritorial U.S. International Tax System, Part 2,” Tax Notes, July 9, 2018,
p. 171.
3

1

For discussion, see David Kamin et al., “The Games They Will Play:
Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax Legislation,”
103 Minn. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming) at 39-61.

We do not write on an empty slate here. For similar analyses that we
found helpful, see in particular: Lee A. Sheppard, “Is Taxing GILTI
Constitutional?” State Tax Notes, July 30, 2018, p. 439; and Michael
Mazerov, “Legislators: Don’t Feel Guilty About Taxing GILTI” (Nov. 17,
2018).
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a substantial — and growing — phenomenon.
Second, we agree that absent effective antiabuse
rules, the federal move to a territorial system
would have dramatically increased the
incentives for U.S. corporate taxpayers to try to
shift their income abroad. Third, in identifying
the scope of the problem and the income
shifted, we agree that it is useful to look for
anomalies. For example, there are many
jurisdictions where U.S. corporations report
profits that constitute multiples of that
5
jurisdiction’s GDP; it is clearly impossible that
the reported income was actually earned in that
jurisdiction in a real sense. Another — and
related anomaly — is that assets and people in
some jurisdictions seem to produce gigantic
amounts of reported income relative to similar
6
assets in other jurisdictions. Of course, workers
in these jurisdictions are not really more
profitable; the excess profitability is just an
artifact of income shifting.
Again, as a result of the 2017 federal tax
legislation, the U.S. is no longer even trying to tax
corporations on their worldwide income. GILTI is
therefore an attempt to counter an increased
incentive to shift income, and it does so by
applying the reasonable notion that excessive
profitability indicates shifted income.
It must be noted, however, that GILTI was not
carefully crafted and much remains unknown as
to how well it will actually operate in practice.
Notably, certain prominent commentators, such
7
as the Congressional Budget Office, do not expect
it to be very effective. One issue is that the deemed

8

normal rate of return is pretty high. Others have
argued that many non-income-shifting taxpayers
will be saddled with large amounts of GILTI
because of the way GILTI calculates the asset base
on which a taxpayer is permitted a normal return.9
This might be so, though we would be surprised
if, even over the short run, taxpayers did not find
ways to increase their foreign asset base or engage
10
in other maneuvers to reduce their GILTI.
In any case, our point is not to evaluate GILTI
as a matter of federal tax policy, but only to
explain at a basic level what GILTI reasonably
tries to do and likely will accomplish to at least
some extent.
State Tax Policy From 20,000 Feet
In evaluating state tax policy options, we
think it particularly important to start with
opportunity-cost analysis. States operate under
11
balanced budget constraints and typically rely
on three tax bases: personal income tax, corporate
income tax, and the retail sales tax. Thus, the
question whether to conform to GILTI is a
question about (1) whether the cost of conformity
is worth it given what the state will do with the
money, and (2) whether raising revenue through
GILTI conformity is appealing relative to the use
of some other revenue instrument. Generally,
GILTI conformity is appealing for several reasons:
1. Though states’ needs vary greatly, we
have little difficulty identifying significant
needs on the revenue side. State revenues
are cyclical, but spending needs are

8

4

Jane G. Gravelle, “Policy Options to Address Corporate Profit
Shifting: Carrots or Sticks?” (Apr. 26, 2016) (“While the magnitude of
corporate profit shifting by U.S. multinationals into low or no tax
countries is uncertain, there is overwhelming evidence of its existence
and its increase in recent years.”).
5

Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, “American Corporations
Tell IRS That 61 Percent of Their Offshore Profits Are in 10 Tax Havens”
(Nov. 5, 2017).
6

Thomas R. Tørsløv, Ludvig S. Wier, and Gabriel Zucman, “The
Missing Profits of Nations” at 19. (“Foreign firms in tax havens are an
order of magnitude more profitable than local firms, while foreign firms
in other countries are less profitable than local firms. That is, there is a
clear trace in global macro data of movements of profits within divisions
of multinational groups, away from high-tax affiliates and towards lowtax affiliates.”).
7

Congressional Budget Office, “The Budget and Economic Outlook:
2018 to 2028,” at 124, 127 (Apr. 2018). See also Kimberly A. Clausing,
“Profit Shifting Before and After the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” (Oct. 29,
2018).
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Rebecca Kysar, ”Critiquing (and Repairing) the New International
Tax Regime,” 128 Yale L. J. Forum 339 (2018). Other issues include the
ability to apply foreign tax credits across jurisdictions. Id. States do not
offer credits, but to the extent the provision of credits at the federal level
makes GILTI less effective at combating income stripping, then the states
will suffer.
9

See, for example, Joseph X. Donovan et al., “State Taxation of GILTI:
Policy and Constitutional Ramifications,” State Tax Notes, Oct. 22, 2018,
p. 315.
10

Richard Rubin, “Qualcomm Tax Move Will Save Firm $570
Million,” The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 30, 2019. It appears that Qualcomm
has moved to do its foreign business through branches, rather than
CFCs, to avoid GILTI and BEAT — and to take advantage of FDII. Note
that this strategy could increase Qualcomm’s state corporate income tax
liability depending on how these changes interact with its water’s-edge
election. See also Mitchell Goldberg and Bryan Appel, “Sometimes GILTI
Is a Pleasure,” Law360, Jan. 31, 2019 (additional thoughts on tax planning
to reduce tax liability in a GILTI world).
11

For discussion, see David Gamage, “Preventing State Budget
Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem,” 98 Calif. L. Rev. 749
(2010).
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counter-cyclical — so simply taking
revenue raised by GILTI conformity and
using it to shore up state reserve funds
would be money well spent.
2. As an administrative matter, the primary
benefit from conformity is that it is easy.
To be sure, as we will discuss in a
forthcoming essay, taxing GILTI at the
state level does implicate apportionment
issues, but we do not believe those need to
create significant new compliance
burdens.
3. As a distributive matter, taxing GILTI is
relatively progressive. The incidence of the
corporate income tax is a longstanding
mystery, much less the incidence of GILTI,
but some portion of the tax is borne by
shareholders. Thus, conforming to GILTI
makes state taxes more progressive when
state tax systems are relatively regressive
at a moment of rising income inequality.
4. At its core, GILTI is a base-broadening
provision. Raising additional revenue by
broadening the base is, ceteris paribus,
more efficient than increasing taxes. Even
if a state had no interest in new revenue or
making its tax system more progressive, it
would still benefit from pairing
conformity to GILTI with a reduction in its
corporate income tax rates.
Into the Weeds With GILTI
States have been struggling with the
disproportionate erosion of their corporate tax
bases for a long time.12 Indeed, there is a
compelling argument that the answer that some
states arrived at by the 1980s — mandatory
worldwide combination with formulary
apportionment — remains the best available
option for both U.S. states and national
governments.13 The benefit of this system is that it
does not matter where a unitary business says
that it earns income; the income will be

apportioned to a jurisdiction based on some
reasonable metric. This system represents the
opposite of the current regime. Under mandatory
worldwide combination, the assumption is that
assets earn about the same rate of return wherever
located, a much more reasonable (if imperfect)
surmise than the current system that — as noted
— must countenance that there are super assets in
particular super jurisdictions.
Regrettably, in a story that has been amply
14
explained elsewhere, the U.S. government,
under pressure from foreign governments,
pressured states to abandon worldwide
combination. Moreover, federal tax policy has
further encouraged erosion of the shared federal
and state corporate tax bases in a number of ways,
including: (1) instituting the check-the-box
regulations, which undermined subpart F (a
Kennedy-era attempt to curb income stripping),15
and (2) providing and proposing repatriation
holidays, which have further encouraged income
16
shifting. Thus, the federal government has
forced states to abandon their best tool to counter
profit shifting while simultaneously exacerbating
the profit-shifting problem.
This is the story that has brought us to GILTI,
which we consider to be a serious, if partially
flawed, attempt by the federal government to
counter a problem that federal tax policy was
otherwise going to make dramatically worse by
shifting to a territorial system for the corporate tax
base. In other words, more than 30 years after
claiming it intended to help states counter profit
shifting to make up for the loss of worldwide
17
combination, the federal government has finally
— if not exactly deliberately — made good on this

14

See Hellerstein, supra note 13.

15

Lawrence Lokken, “Whatever Happened to Subpart F? U.S. CFC
Legislation After the Check-the-Box Regulations,” 7(186) Fla. Tax Rev.
(2005). Note that the check-the-box regulations were apparently the
weapon used by Qualcomm to reduce its tax liability under the GILTI
regime.
16

Lisa De Simone, Joseph D. Piotroski, and Rimmy E. Tomy,
“Repatriation Taxes and Foreign Cash Holdings: The Impact of
Anticipated Tax Reform” (Dec. 7, 2017).
17

12

See Mazerov, supra note 3.

13

See Jerome R. Hellerstein, “Federal Income Taxation of
Multinationals: Replacement of Separate Accounting With Formulary
Apportionment,” State Tax Notes, Aug. 23, 1993, p. 407; and Darien
Shanske, “White Paper on Eliminating the Water’s Edge Election and
Moving to Mandatory Worldwide Combined Reporting,” State Tax
Notes, Sept. 17, 2018, p. 1181.

The second principle on which there was agreement of the
Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group was that there should be
“increased federal administrative assistance and cooperation with the
states to promote full taxpayer disclosure and accountability.” U.S.
Department of the Treasury, “The Final Report of the Worldwide Unitary
Taxation Working Group: Chairman’s Report and Supplemental Views,”
at 9. Congress never passed the necessary legislation. Multistate Tax
Commission, “Timeline of Events in the History of the MTC.”
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commitment. With this background, it seems clear
to us that states should take this opportunity and,
ideally, improve it.
The converse of conforming and getting at
least some base expansion from GILTI is to suffer
the further unmitigated erosion of the corporate
tax base that the 2017 federal tax legislation would
incentivize without GILTI. To go back to
opportunity-cost analysis, this will mean that
some other taxpayers or government programs
will have to pay the price.
Conclusion
Of course, just because the states should (in our
view) conform to GILTI does not mean that they can.
Accordingly, we will present the legal analysis for
18
how states can do so in a forthcoming essay. For
now, we will conclude this essay with a short
preview of that analysis. Modern dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence — indeed, modern
federal constitutional law more generally — puts a
thumb on the scale when it comes to state power,
particularly as to revenue-raising. It would be quite
surprising, therefore, if the states were to be
forbidden from conforming to a provision that
reasonably — if imperfectly — shores up their
ability to tax corporate income.


18

If you can’t wait, see Shanske, “Once More on States and GILTI:
States Should Conform to GILTI (And Why I Believe They Will
(Eventually))” Medium.com (Dec. 27, 2018).
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